Introduction
According to estimates by the U.N. Development Program, by 2020 the joint economic output of Brazil, India, and China alone is expected to exceed the combined production of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. For all these reasons, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of country-level corporate governance studies in different emerging economies, 13 4 they still lag far behind the immense literature covering developed countries.
Nevertheless, devising a common framework to examine the state of corporate law and governance in emerging markets remains challenging, for the simple reason that these countries are a diverse bunch. The very label emerging markets was first crafted in the 1980s, not as a scholarly category, but simply as a marketing tool for a new index of foreign stocks -as a substitute for the then prevailing, but evidently unappealing, designation of "Third World" countries. Since then, the tag also came to encompass certain ex-communist economies of the Second World, hence rendering the group even more heterogeneous.
Yet the shared trait of underdevelopment is evidently insufficient as a signal of underlying commonalities. Emerging markets are arguably even more diverse than developed economies, even though the latter's corporate governance systems are seldom grouped and studied as a unitary category. Indeed, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea, and Turkey -to list only a few prominent examples -have deeply diverse histories, political systems, legal regimes, and economic structures. It should therefore come as no surprise that their corporate governance practices, too, look significantly different. Consequently, most sweeping generalizations about corporate governance in emerging markets -even if illuminating at a high level of abstraction -are unlikely to provide an accurate depiction of individual countries' realities.
With this caveat in mind, the remainder of this Chapter explores some of the key characteristics shared by corporate governance systems in emerging markets, examines the degree of convergence to international standards in the recent past, and identifies promising avenues for future research. Although the exposition will concentrate on the BRICs -the giant countries that achieved notably high levels of economic growth in the 2000s -, it will also incidentally address the experience of other emerging markets as appropriate. The analysis will focus, in particular, on the driving forces, extent, and contours of corporate governance change in the last decades.
Despite their differences, emerging market economies are all latecomers in terms of capital market development, at least in recent history. But if the "emergence" of their capital markets was once a prophecy, it has since turned into reality, especially for the BRICs. As depicted in Figure 1 below, their stock markets have experienced significant 5 growth since the 1990s -and, along the way, they have also shown a tendency to rise and fall in tandem. Apart from the intrinsic interest in these systems, the examination of the changing structures of corporate governance in emerging markets helps illuminate the variety of institutional arrangements that make capitalism viable around the world.
I. Ownership structures
Most, if not all, emerging market economies operate in a taxing institutional environment that fails both to fully protect property rights and to expediently enforce commercial agreements. These institutional shortcomings, in turn, require different adaptations to the way of doing business. For instance, a lack of property rights protection may concentrate ownership in the hands of the state itself or of otherwise powerful cronies, hence discouraging investment by outsiders. Likewise, difficulties in obtaining timely and impartial court enforcement of commercial agreements may lead firms to rely on extracontractual commitment mechanisms -such as family relationships, or longstanding reputation -or resort to vertical integration. 14 A.
Ownership concentration and business groups
In contrast to the model of dispersed ownership of publicly-traded companies often observed in the United States and the United Kingdom, but similarly to the developed economies of continental Europe, emerging markets boast a system of mostly concentrated corporate ownership in the hands of wealthy families or the state.
Accordingly, the average free float of listed companies in India and Russia does not exceed 35%, compared to over 90% in the United States and the United Kingdom.
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The presence of a powerful controlling shareholder affords political influence and reputational bonding that compensates for a lack of formal property rights protection and contract enforcement. This, in turn, entails that the primary agency costs in listed firms concern the divergent interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders -and not of managers and dispersed shareholders, as is the case in the widely-held corporations that populate Anglo-Saxon markets. 14 
II. Reform efforts
Capital markets in BRIC countries underwent major developments in the last two decades. As depicted in Figure A.
The tortuous path of legislative change
Russia's experience is emblematic of the challenges inherent to large-scale reform. In the 1990s prominent U.S. legal scholars conceived its new corporate statute, which was deliberately based on a model of "self-enforcing" corporate law designed to compensate for the country's otherwise fragile legal system. 43 Nevertheless, the good intentions and the attentiveness to local circumstances were insufficient to make the new law effective, as it notoriously failed to constrain subsequent instances of selfdealing. 44 Adopted in 1994 as the legal framework for China's corporatization strategy, its 54 Admittedly, given the lax treatment of white-collar crimes under Brazilian law, the convictions resulted in no jail sentences; defendants were sanctioned to mandatory community service, a monetary fine, and a temporary ban from serving as executives of publicly-traded companies.
14 implemented a "majority-of-the-minority" approval requirement at shareholders' meetings. Third, CVM improved the existing regulatory landscape through a variety of channels: it published a series of stringent advisory opinions on matters ranging from fiduciary duties to the scope of antitakeover defenses, instituted more expansive disclosure regulations that are stricter than the original Novo Mercado standards, and innovated in permitting proxy access (or conferring reimbursement of expenses incurred in proxy solicitations) to shareholders holding more than 0,5% of the company's stock.
And, finally, CVM has effectively exercised its statutory authority to punish illegal 
The role of courts
Courts have generally played at best a modest and at worst a positively detrimental role in the transformation of corporate governance in emerging markets.
The disadvantages of relying on the judiciary for investor protection include unreasonable delays, lack of technical sophistication, and even outright corruption. In most emerging market economies, corporate and securities litigation is a comparatively less significant means to rein in abuses by managers and controlling shareholders compared to more developed economies, and especially the United States.
There is a paucity of derivative lawsuits involving public company shareholders in both Brazil and India, even though these jurisdictions experience distinctively high levels of litigiousness in other areas of law. 59 China's more recent recognition of derivative actions "on the books" did little to encourage their filing. 60 Corporate litigation was also virtually nonexistent in South Korea before the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s (with actual derivative lawsuits being unheard of until 1997), but it has since soared. 61 At another extreme, Russia's highly dysfunctional judicial system allows for the filing of lawsuits that are frivolous -but potentially successful, considering the specter of corruption -to be used as a takeover strategy.
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Resistance to legal change is still another issue plaguing courts' role in emerging markets governance. Law. 66 In recent years, Brazilian courts have come to consistently grant minority shareholders' requests for partial dissolution of closely-held corporations, even though such a remedy is not available under the Corporations Law. One might be tempted to interprete this newly recognized right as a creative solution to protect minority shareholders from abuse in situations where they would otherwise be unable to prove the existence of wrongdoing by controlling shareholders and managers. 67 Such innovation, however, is not without costs, for it carries the risk of undermining the company's ability to "lock in" capital, a distinguishing -and economically crucialfeature of the corporate form. 68 
D.

Alternative institutional arrangements
Substitute mechanisms compensate for the difficulties in judicial enforcement.
Given the substantive and procedural legal hurdles to derivative actions in Brazil and India, aggrieved shareholders have typically turned to the securities regulator instead -CVM or SEBI -for more expedient and effective redress. 69 In some countries -such as in China, reputational sanctions through public criticism by the Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges help deter corporate wrongdoing in the absence of formal public enforcement. 72 Individual emerging market companies are also free to adopt sensible corporate governance practices, which empirical studies have found to be associated with improvements in firm performance. 
III. Convergence and persistence in emerging markets governance
If the recent transformation of corporate governance practices in emerging markets is evident, the extent and direction of change remains contested. A main theme of the academic literature in the last decades concerns the impact of globalization on corporate structures and practices. Specifically, the question is whether corporate governance systems around the world have become increasingly uniform (the "convergence thesis"), or if, instead, path dependence significantly constrained the course of subsequent developments (the "persistence thesis"). 75 While this debate 20 beyond the spread of corporate organization itself, there has been a visible tendency toward the implementation of the wide array of corporate law and governance features prevailing in developed, and especially Anglo-Saxon, markets -ranging from independent directors and fiduciary duties to insider trading bans and securities agency enforcement -to emerging market economies. Still, the intensity of such convergence, as well as the precise mix of best practices, can vary dramatically from one jurisdiction to another.
Focusing only on the adoption of identical corporate governance practices prevailing in developed countries will certainly understate the degree of actual convergence. Functional, rather than formal, convergence is often the norm. 79 Diverse arrangements such as public company arbitration, stiff reputational sanctions, and governmental oversight of firm performance all operate as institutional substitutes that further the goal of investor protection without conforming to international "best practices."
Yet it would be both naïve and misguided to overstate the convergence thesis in its strong form. Just as functional convergence is feasible without accompanying formal convergence, the reverse is also true, as formally identical practices can have disparate significance in different underlying environments. Scholars have duly admonished against the "elusive quest" for universal corporate governance standards, recognizing that identical practices can have diverse consequences depending on the prevailing ownership structures. 80 Take, for instance, a longstanding policy prescription of the U.S. corporate governance movement: the separation of the roles of board chair and CEO. By providing the board with independent leadership, the split of roles is designed to ensure that directors are in a position to effectively monitor the company's management.
However, despite major strides, this recommendation remains highly contested in the U.S. context of powerful CEOs, as independent chairs are still far from universal. In
Brazil, where political opposition to corporate governance changes is particularly fierce, companies have refrained from vetoing the inclusion of a mandatory split of positions as a listing requirement for all premium corporate governance listing segments on the BM&FBovespa.
The greater receptivity to independent board leadership by Brazilian firms is less due to their especially strong commitment to best practices of corporate governance than to its different contextual significance. In a system of highly concentrated corporate control, the primary source of agency costs is not managerial omnipotence but rather the potential of abuse by controlling shareholders. While controlling shareholders typically seek to keep management in a tight leash, they do not always covet the consuming office of chief executive. And, even when they do, having an independent board chair may not be exactly threatening when she is elected by the controlling shareholder himself. In fact, a substantial number of Brazilian companies already had a split in place -with the controlling shareholder serving as board chair and delegating everyday managerial decisions to a professional CEO -before the advent of the listing requirement, which makes it far less consequential in the Brazilian context of concentrated ownership than in the U.S. system of dispersed ownership.
Similarly, while the United States has only recently embraced an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation ("say on pay") at least every three years, Brazilian corporate law have long required shareholders to approve executives' overall pay packages on an annual basis. In a context of concentrated ownership, however, the rule has different implications: it provides controlling shareholders with yet another opportunity to supervise management as well as to approve their own salaries as board members. In some Brazilian firms, director compensation to members of the controlling family even exceeds the pay of the professional CEO.
As a general matter, the recent transformation in emerging markets' governance has combined the influence of prevailing practices in mature markets with indigenously designed improvements. China, India, Brazil, and the like.
B. Evolving ownership structures
Changes in ownership structures have proceeded at a somewhat slower pace.
Given the continued predominance of concentrated ownership in the BRICs, hostile takeovers either remain exceedingly rare, or assume a very different meaning. In Russia, a "hostile takeover" is not, as one might expect, the acquisition of a controlling stake from public shareholders against managers' will -a strategy which is hardly feasible
given the presence of a controlling shareholder in most companies. Instead, it refers to the relatively common, if extreme, practice of gaining control over a firm through dubious practices ranging from fraud and corrupt law enforcement to outright violence.
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In Brazil, the failure of the hostile bid by meat processing firm Sadia for its chief competitor Perdigão -the first and only hostile takeover attempt in recent historyillustrates how the apparent increase in ownership dispersion in recent years may be illusory. 83 Despite the absence of a single controlling shareholder, the target's several blockholders were party to a shareholders' agreement, and acted swiftly to reject the offer notwithstanding its sizable premium. Even in India, where a non-trivial minority of firms is widely held, hostile takeovers have faced practical difficulties thanks to hefty regulatory hurdles to control changes as well as the presence of founder-friendly financial institutions. Past hostile bids have failed for reasons ranging from the outright refusal of the target companies to register the acquired shares to strong political opposition leading to the enactment of regulatory impediments. 84 In the 2000s, however, they experienced a revival in the U.S. market, as founders of highly prominent technology firms, such as Google and Facebook, resorted to multiple voting shares to lock in control of the company before going public. 86 And, ironically, the U.S. market might become a refuge for foreign firms seeking entrenched management structures. In 2013, Chinese internet giant Alibaba announced that it would pursue a NYSE listing after the Hong Kong Stock Exchange -its initially preferred venue -refused to exempt it from the listing rules prohibiting dual-class stocks.
C. Stakeholders and corporate governance
Through the effect of concentrated ownership structures and accompanying legal institutions, the interests of (controlling) shareholders often take center stage in emerging market firms. 87 Yet -at least on the books -consideration of stakeholder interests is also particularly salient in their governance. Even though the spurt in economic growth in the 2000s ameliorated social conditions for many, poverty and inequality -not to mention human rights violations -remain a major challenge in emerging market economies. 88 In this context, issues of distribution assume particular significance in shaping different doctrines of corporate law.
In assessing the distributive effects of corporate governance policies, the degree of equity ownership by the general population plays a fundamental role. In a "society of shareholders," the norm of shareholder primacy assumes greater legitimacy compared to contexts in which only a small fraction of the citizenry has a direct stake in stock market outcomes 89 -as is generally the case in emerging markets, where the recent capital market boom was mostly fueled by foreign investors. While on average 40% of the population in developed countries is invested in stock markets, the proportion falls to 5% in emerging economies (ranging, in turn, from a minuscule 0.3% in Brazil to approximately 10% in China). 90 Consequently, in an environment where stockholders are few and far between (and mostly well-off to begin with), the conflict between the interests of shareholders and nonshareholder constituencies assumes special significance. And, distributional concerns aside, the norm of shareholder primacy might also fail to generate efficient outcomes if product markets are uncompetitive, 91 a still common feature of developing countries.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, emerging markets have not fully embraced the pursuit of shareholder value as the exclusive normative goal of corporate law. In the 1990s, when the corporate statute was silent on the content of fiduciary duties, the Chinese government clarified that SOEs should be managed towards the goal of "preserving and increasing the value of State assets," 92 an objective that is distinct from, and that can easily conflict with, the maximization of firm value. Under Brazil's corporations statute "the controlling shareholder must use its influence so as to make the company fulfill its purpose and its social function, and has duties and responsibilities to the other shareholders, employees and the community in which it operates, whose rights and interests he must loyally abide by and respect." 93 The statutory concept of abuse by controlling shareholders is broad enough to explicitly encompass actions that harm not only the company or its minority shareholders, but also the "national economy." 
Conclusion
Today's emerging markets comprise a historical category rooted in the early promise, and later success, in capital market development. The rapid stock market growth in the last decades was associated with deep a transformation in the underlying 97 Id. at 84. 98 Id. at 74. Finally, the very category of emerging markets itself is unlikely to remain stable over time. As the BRIC economies seemed to falter in the second decade of the twentyfirst century, new acronyms surfaced to describe then popular investment destinations.
But irrespective of the precise mix of jurisdictions, attention to the corporate laws and governance structures in a broader array of jurisdictions beyond the traditional few of the Wealthy West is likely here to stay -to the great benefit of those interested in the role of legal institutions in shaping capitalism's different incarnations.
